assumption in one-year models is that, at each settlement date, insurance premia are adjusted to fair value and/or the FDIC forces banks to raise their capital ratios to a fair level. Studies by Allen and Saunders (1993) and Cooperstein, Pennacchi, and Redburn (1995) propose more realistic multiperiod deposit insurance valuation methods.
Even maintaining the counterfactual assumption of prompt option settlement, we develop strong evidence of active risk-shifting. We use the model of Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992) to tie the incremental insurance subsidy received by a bank to changes in the bank's risk exposure. But our paper improves the empirical analysis of risk-shifting in three ways:
(1) (2) (3)
Our sample is substantially larger and is more representative of the population of U.S.
banks than the samples studied in prior work.
We explore differences in risk shifting between healthy and troubled institutions.
There is no reason to expect a uniform risk-shifting pattern across our sample.
Corporate finance theory implies that risk-shifting incentives are strongest for troubled institutions. The very large banks studied in the previous literature include some of the safest in U.S.
We use an improved estimator that recognizes and adjusts for simultaneity bias built by definition into single-equation structural models of bank leverage and risk-adjusted insurance premia.
Our estimates indicate that risk-restraining forces are far weaker than earlier studies suggest. The policy implication of our evidence is that ailing institutions seek more actively to shift risks than other banks do and that in 1985-1994 the regulatory system failed to contain risk-shifting by these banks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the one-period option pricing model for risk-adjusting deposit insurance.
Our sample, methods and results are described in section II. Section III examines the robustness of our findings. Section lV sums up the paper.
The Model
Ronn and Verma ( 1986) model the fair premium for deposit insurance services (P) as the value of a limited-term (one year) put option: where Ov is the instantaneous standard deviation of asset returns, N(0) is the cumulative standard normal distribution, T is the effective maturity (one year).
It is convenient to estimate IPP, the insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits:
ZPP=ZP/B, =~(yz)-(l-d)n;~(yl). (2) 4
Neither the market value of bank assets, V, nor the standard deviation of asset returns, Ov, is observable. They can, however, be estimated using two additional equations. The first equation states the call option valuation assignable to the equity of a levered firm:
where E is the value of the bank's equity, p is the exercise price, as a percentage of the value of deposits.
Variables xl and x2 are defined as follows:
We follow Ronn and Verrna (1986) in modeling FDIC forbearance policy as lowering the exercise price of the shareholders' call option below the value of bank deposits by setting p = 0.97. This procedure neglects the option value of further FDIC forbearance when the p threshold is crossed (Kane (1986)).
The second equation states a relationship between Ov and~E that follows from Ito's lemma:~_
Here,~E is the instantaneous standard deviation of equity returns.
Comparative-static analysis of equation (2) implies that a manager can increase the value of the deposit insurance subsidy by increasing asset risk Ov and/or leverage B/V.
4 Equations (3) and (4) are solved simultaneously for V and ov using Microsoft Excell 5.0 software. Duan et al. (1992) translate this implication into two testable hypotheses by approximating the change in the per-dollar insurance premium as follows:
Equation (5) is rewritten as:
where
A positive~1 would indicate that the bank was successful in increasing its deposit insurance subsidy through risk-shifting during the sample period, that --absent market and government disciplinary responses -- The hypothesis that it may pay a bank to shift risks aggressively when it is in distress implies that positive al and~1 should emerge more frequently at distressed institutions.
To test for risk-shifting by distressed institutions, we reestimated equations (9) and (10) on pooled data introducing interactive dummy variables for financial distress:
In these equations, d = 1 if the bank was undercapitalized in the preceding quarter and d=O otherwise. We augment the analysis with the following two null hypotheses that we expect to reject:
Hypothesis 3: al 1S O Hypothesis 4:~11 <0
Rejecting these two hypotheses would indicate that undercapitalized banks are able to expand their access to deposit insurance subsidy.
Il. Methods and Results

A. Sample Selection and Data
The models derived in the previous section are estimated with quarterly data running from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth quarter of 1994. This bias makes our assessment of risk-shifting by troubled banks conservative. This reinforces our concern that analyzing average risk-shifting for the sample is not sufficient.
It is important to look for groups of banks that actively pursue deposit insurance subsidies.
B. Definition of Variables
Statistical proxies for conceptual variables are briefly discussed below: 
C. Tests of Hypothesis 1 C. 1. Linear Time-Series Estimates
To test Hypothesis 1, equation (9) 
C,2. Nonlinear Least-Squares Estimates
1985-
In regression (9), the left-hand side variable o ", is calculated from variables that include the dependent variable BW. This implies that estimates of U1 from model (9) are biased by variable definitions. To clarify this, we note from (3) and (4) that:
Therefore, (9) can be rewritten as
;=ao+a, aEl-p
With B/V on both sides of equation (14) direct estimates of al suffer from a definitional simultaneity bias. By construction, the endogenous variable B/V enters the regressor.
This renders the regressor stochastic and correlated with the error term &.
To remove this bias from estimates of al, equation (14) can be rearranged into a reduced form by collecting B/V terms on the left-hand sideG:
Column 2 of Table IV , presents estimates of al for each bank using the method of nonlinear least squares. The regressions include a correction for first-order autocorrelation in residuals. Using five percent significance, across the 124 banks, equation (15) yields b Strictly speaking, B/V still enters the right hand side of equation (15) through the term NON. As a practical matter, however, NON remains virtually constant across the sample observations: 99% of all sample values fall between 0.99 and 1. The mean value of the ratio is 0.9995, its standard deviation is 0.0031, and the correlation with BN is only -0.058. twelve positive and five negative estimates of al. Thirteen additional estimates become significantly positive at the ten percent significance. Thus, using the more appropriate nonlinear model (15), only about four percent of the sample banks behave as if they are subject to strong risk-restraining factors. The policy implication is that risk-restricting factors were largely neutralized during the 1985-1994 period.
For 38 banks, models (9) and (15) yield different results for the sign of al. The probability of a discrepancy at least as large as this by pure chance7 is only 4.3x 10-1*. It seems clear that, by not recognizing definitional simultaneity built into equation (9), one is bound to overestimate the strength of risk-restraining factors.
C.3. Pooled Estimates
We next estimate equation (11) for a panel of all banks. To resolve the simultaneity problem identified in the previous subsection, we employ lagged values of the independent variable Ov as instruments. At the cost of introducing specification error, this eliminates contemporaneous correlation between the regressor and the disturbance vector and allows us to obtain a consistent estimator of U1.
We experimented with several specifications for the pooled regression. Likelihoodratio tests indicated the existence of both firm-and time-specific effects, while Hausman tests supported the fixed-effects model against the random-effects model. Using the fixed-effects model allows intercepts to vary across sample banks and periods while holding slopes constant. Results are reported in Table V . The estimated al in this pooled 7 Assuming that the probability of type I error is 5 percent and that these errors are independent, the probability of having 38 type I errors is equal (0.05 )36X124!/[38 !x(124-38)!].
regression proves significantly negative, indicating that, on balance across the sample, risk-restraining factors are strong.
We test Hypothesis 3 that risk-restraining factors differ across banks by using interactive dummy variables. We estimate al separately for two groups of banks: those whose leverage in the preceding quarter lay below ( This finding indicates that restraining forces are weak for banks that become undercapitalized. This implies that regulatory and market disciplines break down in the very cases where they need to be strong.
D. Tests of Hypothesis 2 D.1. Time-Series Estimates
Table VI reports tests of Hypothesis 2 developed from estimates of equation (10) 
Ill. Robustness of Results
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our findings to misspecification and other statistical problems. Overall, our sensitivity tests support the hypothesis of risk-shifting and indicate that risk-restraining factors in 1985-1994 were weak.
A. Simultaneity Bias and Errors-in-Variables
In principle, a bank's leverage and the volatility of its asset returns are simultaneously determined. Neglecting the simultaneity between these variables could bias inferences about risk restraints. Bias could also exist because the unobservable explanatory variable is inevitably measured with error.
An imperfect way to deal with simultaneity bias and errors-in-variables problem is to use instrumental-variable (IV) estimators. A candidate for an instrument must be correlated with the true regressor, but contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term. A workable (but potentially unreliable) approach is to substitute the predetermined (lagged) values for the imperfectly observed regressor. Because we correct for first-order autocorrelation in residuals by quasi-differencing, we introduce the second lag of the explanatory variable as our instrument.
We have already used IV estimation for the pooled regressions relating bank leverage ratios to asset risk, c,. We now apply the same approach to the pooled regressions of risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums. The results reported in Panel B of Table 7 strengthen our earlier conclusions: undercapitalized institutions successfully increase the value of their deposit insurance guarantee, but well-capitalized institutions do not and may indeed not want to.
The IV versions of time-series tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 portray risk-restraining factors as even weaker than our more-restrictive tests did. At 5 percent, the relation between leverage and asset risk proves significantly negative for only three banks. The number rises only to 10 banks at ten percent. The relation between deposit insurance premium, IPP, and asset risk is significantly positive for 12 banks (15 at ten percent).
Although a bank can change its risk exposure overnight, using predetermined values requires us to look at relations between leverage and asset risk that are measured half a year apart. These IV-model results support the hypothesis that regulatory controls on risk shifting operate with substantial lags.
B. Ratio Speci..cation of the Model
It is also desirable to investigate the effect of coefficient restraints that are built into every ratio specification. The models we estimated earlier place implicit restrictions on the coefficient estimates. For example, equation (9) for the regressand B/V is mathematically equivalent to:
An unrestricted version of equation (16) 
IV. Summary and Conclusions
U.S. experience with state deposit-insurance systems (Calomiris, 1992) and corporate finance theory hold that weaknesses in deposit insurance pricing and capital enforcement encourage banks to extract deposit insurance subsidies by increasing their risk exposure.
To test this hypothesis, we decompose it into three parts.
The first part looks to measure the strength of regulatory enforcement as an intensifying risk-restraining factor. We remove definitional simultaneity built in the model used by Duan et al. (1992) to eliminate a bias in previous single-equation estimates of the tested parameters. In contrast to the biased procedure, our tests indicate that riskrestraining factors are weak.
The second part of our tests investigates the frequency of risk shifting among sample banks. Our results indicate that about five percent of the sampled banks succeeded in increasing their deposit insurance subsidy consistently over observation periods of four to ten years.
A third set of tests focuses on endogenous risk-shifting by banks in periods for which benefits from increasing deposit insurance subsidy promise to be extremely high.
Consistent with finance theory, we affirm that risk-shifting behavior is concentrated at the financially weakest banks.
An array of sensitivity tests establi~h the robustness of our principal finding: troubled U.S. banks actively engaged in risk-shifting during 1985-1994 and the regulatory system failed to restrain this behavior adequately. * significant at the 10 percent level using one-tailed test. ** significant at the 5 percent level using one-tailed test. *** significant at tie 1 percent level using one-tailed test.
1each of these banks were part of the sample in Duan et al. (1992) . Pooled regression tests of Hypotheses 1 and 3 using the fixed-effects model with bank-and time-specific intercepts. avjt.z is used as the instrumental variable for~vjt.
Hypothesis 1: al >0. The al is the slope coefficient in the following regression:
BjL/ Vjl = %j + aljavjt + &jt.
where Bjt / V,t is the leverage, ovjt is the annualized standard deviation of asset returns for bank j in quarter t. * significant at the 10 percent level using one-tailed test. ** significant at the 5 percent level using one-tailed test. *** Significant at the 1 percent level using one-tailed test. 
where IPPj( is the risk-adjusted insurance premium per dollar of insured deposits,~vjt is the annualized standard deviation of asset returns for bank j in quarter t. Hypothesis 4:~1*SO. The~1' is the first slope coefficient in the following regression:
IPPjt =~ojt +~l]d~vj~+~l"(l-d)ovj, + <jl ,
where d = 1 for undercapitalized institutions and O otherwise. With dummies 0.027*** 2.68 0.003 0.66 * significant at the 10 percent level using One-tailed test. ** significant at the 5 percent level using one-tailed test. *** significant at the 1 percent level using one-tailed test
